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1 Introduction
This paper is a quantitative study of the consequences for economic development and growth
of alternative international trade arrangements. The main objective is to analyze and quantify
the eﬀects on both eﬃciency (average world income and welfare) and inequality (cross-sectional
dispersion in world incomes and distributional welfare eﬀects).
The starting point (benchmark trade arrangement) is a basic model of an integrated world
economy featuring a large number of small open economies, each producing a single homoge-
neous consumption good and a single homogeneous investment good. Consumption goods are
nontradable, and therefore countries are prevented from intratemporally trading capital goods for
consumption goods. As a consequence, domestic investment prices relative to consumption prices
reﬂect the relative consumption-investment sectoral productivities. Countries may still engage in
intertemporal trade. Financial markets, however, are complete at the national level but incomplete
at the worldwide level. International borrowing and lending is freely allowed through trade in
one-period noncontingent bonds, as long as a country’s net foreign debt does not violate a bor-
rowing constraint. National economies are ex-ante identical, but sector-neutral productivity and
the productivity of the investment goods sector are stochastic. Both technology shocks are purely
country-speciﬁc. In part because these risks are uninsurable in world ﬁnancial markets, national
economies will be diﬀerent ex-post. The model generates time-invariant equilibrium cross-sectional
distributions of development variables, namely GDP per worker, which can be compared with the
data. The basic setup can be seen as combining Clarida (1990), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari’s
(1994) models of heterogeneous agents with Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell’s (1997) model of
investment-speciﬁc technical change.
In the benchmark model of the world economy, part of the cross-country diﬀerences in technology
are speciﬁc to investment goods. This suggests that trading capital goods for consumption goods
should be an important way for technological improvements to diﬀuse internationally. The data,
however, clearly suggests that countries do not beneﬁt to the full extent from this potentially
important channel.
Recent evidence by Eaton and Kortum (2001), on the one hand, documents the importance of
both home bias and regionalism for trade in capital goods. On average, for a cross-section of 34
developing and developed countries in 1985, nearly half of total domestic investment in equipment
comes from domestic production. And when equipment is in fact traded it appears that geography,
in the sense of physical and cultural proximity, plays an important role. Eaton and Kortum (2001)
ﬁnd that barriers to trade in capital goods do have to be very important quantitatively in order to
account for observed trade ﬂows in equipment.
On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, there is also complementary evidence sug-
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gesting that investment goods are not traded enough precisely in exchange for consumption goods.
In particular, De Long and Summers (1991), Jones (1994) and much subsequent work has shown
that the international dispersion in the relative price of equipment is large, and strongly negatively
associated with incomes. Figure 1, which is based on data for 110 countries from the Penn World
Tables (version 6.1) described in Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002), shows a similar negative
association using aggregate investment prices relative to aggregate consumption prices.
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Figure 1: Investment Prices and World Incomes
Figure 1 begs a natural question: what would the consequences for economic development be if
barriers to international trade between investment and consumption goods were eliminated? Elimi-
nating barriers would entail improving the tradability of investment goods per se and, perhaps even
more importantly, improving the tradability of consumption goods as well. In other words, policies
should be aimed at reducing the worldwide dispersion in relative, not just absolute, investment
prices. This way, countries with relatively ineﬃcient investment sectors should be able to import
most of their capital needs, while specializing in producing and exporting consumption goods. One
may conjecture that, following this regime change, the distribution of relative incomes underlying
Figure 1 should become less dispersed (the eﬀect on inequality), and the associated distribution of
absolute incomes should shift to the right (the eﬀect on eﬃciency).
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This question is related to some of the recent literature in economic development, namely
recent work by Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Hsieh and Klenow (2003). Both papers can be seen
as pointing to the potential importance of eliminating barriers to intratemporal trade in diﬀerent
goods. Hsieh and Klenow (2003) trace many important development regularities back to cross-
country diﬀerences in relative consumption-investment sectoral productivities. In their work, like
in this paper’s benchmark model, large relative productivity diﬀerences coexist with large relative
price diﬀerences, which requires some degree of trade impediments. Eaton and Kortum (2001), as
pointed out previously, obtain quantitative measures of impediments to trade in equipment, and
ﬁnd them to be large. Reducing these impediments is an obvious way poor countries may use
comparative advantage to beneﬁt from the superior technology of rich countries. The approach
of this paper is to take observed relative productivity diﬀerences as given, and to consider the
complete elimination of all impediments to trade. As a natural starting point, this paper abstracts
from the potential direct eﬀect that reducing trade impediments might have on the distribution
of productivities. Naturally, not all barriers may be eliminated in practice. Hence, this exercise
should be interpreted as providing an informative upper bound for the potential eﬀects.
To answer the question, and to get an idea of the magnitudes, I consider a modiﬁcation of
the baseline trade arrangement whereby countries may trade freely capital goods for consumption
goods. All remaining features of the original setup are held constant. In particular, labor is still
immobile internationally. In equilibrium, trade is of the Ricardian type, with countries specializing
completely in production at each point in time according to their comparative advantage determined
by technology.
This paper also studies a second change in the world trade arrangement, that of eliminating
world credit markets and thus moving into autarky. This helps shed some light on whether it
is intertemporal trade in the same physical good, or intratemporal trade in diﬀerent goods, that
matters the most for economic development. This is an important question: policymakers often
point to the inability to borrow from abroad in order to invest domestically as one main obstacle to
economic development. As before, the only change in the benchmark setup is in the international
trade arrangement. The resulting world economy becomes a collection of closed economies, and in
this sense bears important similarities to the one studied by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997)
and Restuccia and Urrutia (2001).
Regarding the eﬀect on inequality, the results point to a signiﬁcant decline in world income
dispersion following a complete liberalization of trade. Since returns to capital are equalized inter-
nationally, both in consumption and in investment units, capital-output ratios become essentially
identical across countries. As a consequence, the model predicts a long-run reduction of world
income inequality of about 7.4 percent. It turns out, however, that going from the benchmark
trade arrangement to autarky also reduces the international dispersion in capital-output ratios and
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incomes. Countries that are more eﬃcient at producing capital goods invest more but, for closed
economies, the larger domestic investment must be matched by larger domestic saving. A higher
domestic real interest rate is required to entice higher saving, which in turn discourages investment
and capital accumulation. If economies are open, instead, foreign resources can be used along
with domestic saving in investing, generating a larger eﬀect on capital. Due to this leveraging
via international borrowing, a given degree of international dispersion in the relative eﬃciency of
capital goods production leads to a larger international dispersion in incomes when economies are
open rather than when they are closed. I conclude in particular that long-run income dispersion
would be reduced by about 1.3 percent if world credit markets were eliminated. These ﬁndings sug-
gest that the eﬀect of openness on world income inequality should depend crucially on the speciﬁc
changes being made on the international trade arrangement. By providing well-deﬁned concepts
of openness, which are based upon changes in the worldwide trade arrangement, the present set-
ting should be particularly helpful in addressing this question. If openness means liberalization
of ﬁnancial markets, then world income inequality should increase slightly. If, instead, openness
means liberalization of goods’ markets, then world income inequality would be signiﬁcantly re-
duced. For less stylized changes in openness, with elements of both ﬁnancial market and goods
market liberalization, the eﬀect on inequality may well be ambiguous.
The results on eﬃciency and welfare are quite striking. Quantitatively, while shutting-down
ﬁnancial markets would produce a relatively small average welfare loss, equivalent to a 2 percent
decrease in steady-state consumption, fully liberalizing trade in goods would have a very large av-
erage welfare gain, equivalent to a 35 percent increase in steady-state consumption. A substantial
part of this large welfare improvement arises from static production specialization gains, and there-
fore is not all compensated by lower transitional welfare gains. With transitional eﬀects explicitly
taken into account, the overall welfare gain is still equivalent to a very signiﬁcant 25 percent in-
crease in consumption. I also ﬁnd important distributional welfare eﬀects. Welfare improvements
are substantially larger for currently poorer countries. They are also larger for countries with high
relative investment prices and low capital-output ratios, that is, for countries that are particularly
ineﬃcient at producing capital goods.
In a world with signiﬁcant investment-speciﬁc technical diﬀerences, liberalizing intratemporal
trade in goods at the worldwide level seems to be particularly important in raising living standards.
Financial market liberalization alone is a poor substitute at best. A tentative policy implication
from this paper’s results is that more eﬀort should be concentrated in promoting free trade in goods
and not so much in promoting full or improved access to world credit markets, as is sometimes the
emphasis of institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.1
1Many authors endorse the view that international ﬁnancial ﬂows are potentially very important in the long-run.
For a recent example see Summers (2000).
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and deﬁnes the equilibrium.
Section 3 analyzes the setup with free mobility of capital. Section 4 brieﬂy describes the solution
method. Section 5 discusses measurement and calibration issues. Section 6 presents the main
results and discusses some limitations of the analysis, and Section 7 concludes. The Appendix
contains some details on the data set, on the numerical procedure, and on the potential role of
transportation costs.
2 Model World Economies
I consider a world economy composed of a continuum of small open economies with unit measure,
each potentially producing two goods: a single homogeneous consumption good and a single ho-
mogeneous investment good. All consumers have identical preferences. All ﬁrms have access to the
state-of-the-art technology but, due to country-speciﬁc factors, ﬁrms in diﬀerent countries may end
up using diﬀerent technologies.
Part of the country-speciﬁc diﬀerences in technology are sector-neutral, i.e. they are common
to both sectors of production. An important component of the diﬀerences in technology, instead,
is speciﬁc to the production of investment goods. I next describe various versions of a model world
economy, where individual countries are subject to these two sources of technological diﬀerences,
and which diﬀer only in terms of the international trade arrangement.
2.1 Environment
I start by describing the assumptions on preferences, technology, and the diﬀerent market arrange-
ments. To save on notation, I omit country subscripts.
Preferences
Each individual consumer has preferences deﬁned over streams of consumption given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (Ct) .
Leisure is not valued and individuals will inelastically supply their total time endowment of one
unit to market activities.
Technology
Each national economy may produce a single consumption good Y c according to
Y ct = AztF (K
c
t , N
c
t ) ,
and a single investment good Y i according to
Y it = (Azt/Aθt)F
(
Kit , N
i
t
)
,
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where F is a neoclassical national production function satisfying all the usual properties. The
sectorial inputs, stock of physical capital and labor input (total man-hours employed), must add
up to the total quantities available in each country, so that
Kdt = K
c
t + K
i
t
Nt = N
c
t + N
i
t ,
where Kdt is the domestic capital stock, employed in period t’s production. The labor force grows
exogenously at a constant rate which is the same for all countries. Both inputs to production are
perfectly mobile across sectors at the national level.
The technological parameters are deﬁned by Azt = ztXzt and Aθt = θtXθt, where the pair
(Xzt,Xθt) is deterministic and common to all countries, representing the state of the world tech-
nology frontier at time t, and the pair (zt, θt) is a stochastic transitory component of technology,
which is country-speciﬁc. The deterministic components of technology grow exogenously at con-
stant rates. Instead, the country-speciﬁc components follow a joint stationary ﬁrst-order Markov
process described by:
st+1 = µ + Γst + εt+1, (1)
where st ≡ (ln zt, ln θt)
 and εt+1 is a vector of innovations. The elements determining the transi-
tion, that is µ, Γ and the stochastic process for the innovations, are homogenous across countries,
and a law of large numbers is assumed to hold in the cross-section. Countries are ex-ante identical,
and diﬀer only ex-post, to the extent that their shock histories also diﬀer. In other words, there is
no ex-ante heterogeneity across countries.
The view implicit in this formulation is that all countries may potentially beneﬁt from the world
technology frontier at all times. At a point in time, however, diﬀerent countries perform diﬀerently
relative to the world frontier. This may be due to various factors, such as Parente and Prescott’s
(2002) idea of obstacles to technology adoption. These factors are represented by st, and they are
not modelled explicitly. This paper’s exercise will be to ask, given these factors, how important
diﬀerent trade arrangements can be for economic development.
Gross domestic output in consumption units, or real GDP in the model, is deﬁned by
Yt = Y
c
t + PtY
i
t ,
where Pt is the relative price of investment goods in terms of consumption goods in a given country
at time t. Output can be consumed, invested, or transferred to foreigners, in the amount TBt,
according to a nationwide resource constraint
Yt = Ct + PtIt + TBt,
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where PtIt are the net purchases of investment goods and TBt is the trade balance, both measured
in terms of Ct. Physical capital depreciates geometrically at rate δ ∈ [0, 1]. The capital stock owned
by residents, denoted by Kt, evolves according to
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt.
Depending on the market arrangement considered, Kt and K
d
t may diﬀer. That is, residents may
not own all of their domestic capital stock, or they may own part of other countries’ capital stocks.2
Markets
I consider three diﬀerent market arrangements in the world economy: benchmark trade, free
trade, and no trade. The benchmark trade arrangement features free trade in ﬁnancial assets
and capital goods. Free trade is the benchmark trade arrangement with the addition of trade in
consumption goods, and no trade corresponds to autarky. In the reminder of the paper, I will
abbreviate benchmark trade by BT, free trade by FT, and no trade by NT.
Financial markets are complete at the national level but incomplete at the worldwide level. In
particular, the set of international ﬁnancial assets is restricted exogenously to a one period riskless
bond denominated in terms of consumption. International borrowing and lending is freely allowed
at the world interest rate rt+1, as long as countries do not violate a borrowing constraint. Labor is
always immobile internationally, so that countries are deﬁned by the location of their labor input.
I now describe in more detail the assumptions underlying each trade regime, starting with free
trade, since the remaining two regimes may be obtained by imposing certain particular restrictions
on free trade.
Under the free trade (FT) arrangement, both consumption goods and capital goods are freely
tradable. Physical capital can thus be freely traded intratemporally for consumption goods. I make
an admittedly extreme assumption regarding the mobility of physical capital within each period. I
assume it can be traded in either one of two markets. First, it can be traded on an ex-ante market.
That is, before next period’s technology is revealed, a competitive market opens up for buying and
selling units of capital at price Pt. Newly-produced capital, in particular, is traded only in this
market, due to some form of “time to build.” There is thus a symmetry between domestically-
produced new capital goods and new capital goods purchased in world markets, in that decisions
involving either of them are made under uncertainty about future production conditions. Second,
capital can also be traded ex-post. That is, after uncertainty is resolved, there is a competitive
worldwide rental market for all capital that has been produced up to that moment, paying a gross
2One may ﬁnd it useful to notice that the trade balance should equal total net exports, measured in consumption
units. Hence, one could write TBt = X
c
t + PtX
i
t , where X
c
t = Y
c
t − Ct and Xit = Y it − It are the net exports
of consumption and investment goods, respectively. In turn, through the balance-of-payments identity, TBt should
equal the current account less the net factor income from abroad. In what follows, TBt is deﬁned in terms of this
counterpart. The speciﬁc form it takes will depend on the market arrangement considered.
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return of Rˆt units of consumption per unit of capital rented. Throughout the paper I refer to the
ex-post market as the “market for old capital goods.”3
The domestic capital stock, that is, the capital stock employed in domestic production, can
thus be decomposed as
Kdt = Kt −K
T
t ,
where Kt is the component owned by residents, and K
T
t corresponds to net exports, in the form of
rentals, of physical capital services. The resident-owned net addition to the domestic capital stock
may come partially from producing new capital goods and partially from buying new capital goods
in world markets. It is equivalent, however, to think of all countries that produce investment goods
as ﬁrst selling all their production, and then purchasing their desired It in world markets. This
way It corresponds to total purchases, and Y
i
t to total sales, of new capital goods at time t for any
given country.4 Domestic investment in this setup may be deﬁned accordingly as
Idt = K
d
t+1 − (1− δ)K
d
t .
For clarity, Figure 2 provides a summary of the timing under free trade. Period t begins with a
new technology pair. With this information, ﬁrms decide how much capital to use in production this
period, by renting capital services in world markets. They may thus complement the resident-owned
capital stock carried over from period t−1. Production takes place with the domestic capital stock
Kdt . Next, payments on beginning-of-period net foreign bond holdings (Bt) and current-period
capital rentals are carried out. Finally, agents decide how much to consume, how much to save in
the form of foreign bonds, and how much physical capital to buy or sell in the world market for
new capital goods.
Countries must own positive amounts of physical capital and are thus unable to borrow in the
world market for new capital, so that
Kt ≥ 0,
and I also assume that, in the world market for old capital, countries can rent capital services only
3Capital can thus be installed in the period of its use in production. A more standard arrangement would allow
for trade in the ex-ante market only. It turns out, however, that its quantitative implications are almost identical to
those under FT - these results are available upon request. This is not very surprising: what ex-post capital rentals
allow is for countries to trade away ex-post diﬀerences in returns induced by diﬀerences in realized capital-output
ratios. In this model, however, very little heterogeneity in capital-output ratios remains if heterogeneity in Aθt plays
no role, as it will be the case under FT. The analysis would become signiﬁcantly more complicated under this more
standard arrangement, since there would be no simple arbitrage condition linking the world price of capital and the
real world interest rate. Section 3 demonstrates that, due precisely to this arbitrage condition, the model under FT
may be recast in a much simpler way, which will be critical to the computation of the transition to the free trade
regime. Ex-post trade in capital is thus assumed mainly for simplicity, and it does not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the quantitative results.
4Throughout the paper I refer to the ex-ante market as the market for new capital even though It < 0 is possible,
which means that a country would be selling old capital units in the ex-ante market.
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t t + 1 time
(zt, θt)
KTt
Yt (1 + rt)Bt, RˆtK
T
t
Ct, Bt+1,Kt+1
Figure 2: Timing under Free Trade
up to the capital stock owned by residents, or
KTt ≤ Kt.
The trade balance records all transactions between residents and foreigners and is given by
TBt = Bt+1 − (1 + rt)Bt −
[
Rˆt − (1− δ)Pt
]
KTt , (2)
where the last term is the net inﬂow of resources associated with capital rentals decided at the
end of last period (part of the the net factor income from abroad), with the component in square
brackets being the world rental price of capital.
The constraint on international borrowing takes the form
Bt+1 ≥ B (Ωt, zt, θt) , (3)
where B (Ωt, zt, θt) denotes the minimum net asset level allowed. The constraint (3) may be due
to informational and commitment problems, but I will not be explicit about them. In anticipation
of the recursive formulation of the country’s problem of Section 2.3, the limit on borrowing is
restricted to be a function of the current state (Ωt, zt, θt) , where Ωt denotes the total amount of
resources available for domestic consumption, or a country’s wealth in period t:
Ωt ≡ Yt + (1− δ)PtKt +
[
Rˆt − (1− δ)Pt
]
KTt + (1 + rt)Bt.
Under the benchmark trade (BT) arrangement, only capital goods are tradable,5 so that
KTt = 0 and Pt = Aθt for all t. This means that there are no intratemporal trades across countries,
only intertemporal trades. I analyze this setup in more detail in a companion paper, Castro (2004).
5The results in this paper do not depend upon which of the two goods, capital or consumption, is nontradable.
With one of them nontradable, intratemporal trades between goods are not possible, and relative investment prices
reﬂect relative sectoral productivities. I emphasize nontradable consumption for the sake of realism, since most
capital goods, equipment in particular, are traded more than most consumption goods. Hsieh and Klenow (2003)
also take this view. As pointed out by Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Hsieh and Klenow (2003), in this extreme
case, absolute investment prices (i.e., expressed in terms of some numeraire currency) are equalized internationally,
but relative investment prices are higher in countries with relatively ineﬃcient investment sectors (analogous to the
Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect). As in the main text, relative investment prices reﬂect relative consumption-investment
sectoral productivities. This same result would arise if the nontradable good was instead capital. The choice of the
nontradable good would only have consequences for cross-country diﬀerences in absolute investment and consumption
prices.
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Finally, under no trade (NT), there are neither intratemporal nor intertemporal trades, so
that all countries live in autarky. Hence, it is still the case that KTt = 0 and Pt = Aθt for all t,
6
but now also Bt = 0 for all t. This arrangement shares some similarities with Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (1997) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2001). In particular, the world economy becomes a
collection of closed economies that do not interact with one another.
Individuals are homogeneous within each country, even if potentially subject to purely idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty. Since domestic ﬁnancial markets are complete one may focus on the planner’s
problem at the national level, equipped with the preferences and technology described above. The
resulting allocation at the national level can be decentralized by various schemes (see for example
Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott, 1989).
2.2 Model Speciﬁcation
The speciﬁcation of preferences and technology is standard and obeys the restrictions required for
balanced growth to be possible. Momentary utility is described by a isoelastic function
u (Ct) =
C1−σt
1− σ
, (4)
where σ > 0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (if σ = 1 then momentary utility is logarith-
mic).
Production in both sectors is done according to the same Cobb-Douglas production function,
common to all countries
F
(
Kjt , N
j
t
)
=
(
Kjt
)α (
N jt
)1−α
for j = i, c, (5)
where 0 < α < 1 is the share of physical capital. The deterministic components of technology grow
at rates Xzt+1/Xzt = γ
1−α
z and Xθt+1/Xθt = γ
−1
θ , with γz, γθ ≥ 1. The labor force grows at rate
γn ≥ 1. In the long-run, output and consumption in particular will grow at rate γ ≡ γnγzγ
α/(1−α)
θ .
Finite utility requires βγ1−σ < 1, which holds by assumption. Variables are normalized so that
N0 = Xz0 = Xθ0 = 1.
The borrowing constraint is assumed to be
B (Ωt, zt, θt) = −ηΩt, (6)
so that a national economy is able to borrow only up to a multiple η ≥ 0 of current resources.7
6Under perfect competition, with free mobility of factors across sectors and F CRS, it is easy to show that under
both BT and NT a single aggregate resource constraint can be written as AztF
 
Kdt , Nt

= Ct + PtI
d
t + TBt, with
Pt = Aθt being the autarkic price of investment. There are no intratemporal trades in this case. This aggregation
is possible since cost minimization requires employing the same capital-labor intensity across sectors, equal to the
aggregate intensity.
7Suppose that, due to implicit informational and commitment problems, lenders require countries to ﬁnance at
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The technology shocks follow a vector autoregressive (VAR) process of order one in logs. In
particular, in the transition equation (1):
µ =
(
µz
µθ
)
, Γ =
(
ρzz ρzθ
ρθz ρθθ
)
, (7)
and εt ≡ (εzt, εθt) is a vector of innovations which is i.i.d. N (0,Σ) with
Σ =
(
σ2z σzθ
σzθ σ
2
θ
)
. (8)
This parsimonious speciﬁcation choice is dictated by the need to simplify the solution of the model.
It also turns out to be suﬃciently ﬂexible, in the sense that it is able to capture the key empirical
features of cross-sectional distribution of productivities, in particular it is able to match quanti-
tatively the cross-country dispersion in measured productivity indexes. This is discussed in more
detail in Section 5.
2.3 Equilibrium
I study the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium of the world economy under each of the
three trade arrangements. All variables are appropriately transformed in terms of eﬃciency units
of labor, so that they remain constant over time in the nonstochastic steady-state of the model,
and are denoted with lower-case letters. We then have λt = Λt/γ
t for Λt = Ct, Bt, Yt, Y
c
t and Ωt,
and λt = Λt/ (γγθ)
t for Λt = Y
i
t ,K
d
t ,K
T
t ,Kt, I
d
t and It. Detrended world prices are denoted by
pt = γ
t
θPt and Rt = γ
t
θRˆt. The country’s state space is S ≡ Ω × Z × Θ = R
3
+. In what follows I
denote with primes next-period variables and without primes current-period variables.
In the FT arrangement, countries will specialize completely in the production of either con-
sumption or investment goods at a point in time, according to whether p < θ or p ≥ θ, respectively,
and where θ corresponds to the (detrended) relative price of capital under autarky.8 Incorporating
this specialization decision, production for an economy under FT becomes
y = max {1, p/θ} z (k − kT )
α .
That is, countries specialize completely in production, and depending on the path of θ we may
have drastic changes in comparative advantage over time. Since technology turn out to be very
persistent, these changes will not happen often though.
least a fraction 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 of their current total ex-ante period t expenditures (those potentially subject to ﬁnancial
frictions) out of current domestic resources, so that κ (Ct + PtKt+1) ≤ Ωt. Using the resource constraint to substitute
for Ct this can be written as in (6) with η ≡ (1− κ) /κ ≥ 0. The parameter κ is equivalent to the margin requirement
in Aiyagari and Gertler (1999). The constraint (6) is a tractable reduced form of a more explicit setup capturing the
basic feature that richer countries are able to borrow more. Finally, note that Ct,Kt+1 ≥ 0 imply Ωt ≥ 0.
8By assumption, countries with p = θ will specialize completely in the production of investment goods. At the
cost of increased complexity, would could in principle introduce heterogeneity in goods as a way to avoiding complete
specialization in production. In a related setting, Eaton and Kortum (2001) explore some of the implications of
heterogeneity in capital goods.
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I next deﬁne a competitive equilibrium under FT. The corresponding deﬁnitions under BT and
NT are particular cases, namely they can be obtained by setting p = θ and kT = 0 (BT), and p = θ,
kT = 0 and b = 0 (NT).
Deﬁnition A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium for the world economy under
free trade is a value function v (ω, s) , a set of decision rules c (ω, s), b′ (ω, s), k′ (ω, s) and
k′T (ω, s; s
′) , a cross-sectional distribution of countries ψ over individual states (ω, s) and world
prices r, p and R such that:
1. Given r, p and R, the decision rules c (ω, s), b′ (ω, s), k′ (ω, s) and k′T (ω, s; s
′) solve the
country’s problem and v (ω, s) is the corresponding value function, that is, for all (ω, s) ∈ S:
v (ω, s) = max
c,b′,k′
{
u (c) + βγ1−σEs max
k′
T
v
(
ω′, s′
)}
subject to
γ
(
γθpk
′ + b′
)
+ c ≤ ω
ω′ ≡ y′ + [R− (1− δ) p] k′T + (1− δ) pk
′ + (1 + r) b′
y′ ≡ max
{
1, p/θ′
}
z′
(
k′ − k′T
)α
γb′ ≥ −ηω
c ≥ 0, k′ ≥ 0, k′ ≥ k′T
s′ = µ + Γs + ε′
b0 = 0; s0, k0 > 0 given.
2. The world foreign bond market clears:∫
S
b′ (ω, s) dψ = 0. (9)
The world market for old capital clears:∫
S×S
k′T
(
ω, s; s′
)
dψdψ′ = 0.
The world market for new capital clears:∫
S
yi
(
ω′, s′
)
dψ′ =
∫
S×S
i
(
ω, s, ω′, s′
)
dψdψ′.
3. The distribution of countries is stationary and consistent with countries’ behavior:
ψ
(
Sˆ
)
=
∫
S
P
(
x, Sˆ
)
dψ (x) for all Sˆ ∈ BS ,
where P : S × BS → [0, 1] is a transition function, induced by the decision rules and by the
stochastic process for s, and BS is the Borel σ-algebra of subsets of S.
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3 Free Trade Arrangement in the Long-Run
One useful property of the FT arrangement is that it is possible to recast it in terms of a problem
similar to the one studied in Clarida (1990). That is, the world under FT is analogous to a world
of endowment economies, subject to idiosyncratic shocks to their endowments and with access to
international borrowing and lending and a higher bound on national debt.
Too see this, notice that the ﬁrst-order conditions to the problem deﬁned in Section 2.3 yield:
(
k′T
)
: R =
αy′
k′ − k′T
+ p (1− δ)
(
k′
)
: γθp ≥ βγ
−σEs
[
u′ (c′)
u′ (c)
R
]
with = if k′ > 0
(
b′
)
: (1 + r)−1 ≥ βγ−σEs
[
u′ (c′)
u′ (c)
]
with = if γb′ > −ηω,
implying for an unconstrained economy
γθp (1 + r) = R. (10)
Since unconstrained economies will have a positive measure in equilibrium, world prices must satisfy
(10). Equation (10) reﬂects the fact that new capital and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes as
stores of value, and that new and old capital are perfect substitutes in production. Moreover, the
existence of a competitive world market for renting old capital means that old capital must earn
the world return everywhere, which is ﬁxed. As a consequence, this framework does not provide
sharp predictions, neither for the composition of saving, nor for the composition of domestic capital
at the country level.
Substituting equation (10) in the ﬁrst-order condition for k′T implies that at all times and for
all countries, given k′, k′T will adjust so that
k′T = k
′ −
[
αz′max
{
1, p/θ′
}
p (γθ (1 + r)− 1 + δ)
]1/(1−α)
(11)
≡ k′ − kd
(
s′
)
.
From (11) it follows that kd (s) /y = α/ [p (γθ (1 + r)− 1 + δ)]. Free mobility of old capital is crucial
here, since it eliminates any cross-sectional or temporal dispersion in domestic capital-output ratios.
Naturally, both expected and realized returns to capital will be equalized as well.
This feature makes it possible to simplify the problem dramatically. Using (11), one can recast
the country’s problem in terms of choosing simply between consumption and saving, the latter
being deﬁned by
x′ ≡ γθpk
′ + b′. (12)
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That is, the country’s problem can now be stated as:
v (ω, s) = max
c,x′
{
u (c) + βγ1−σEsv
(
ω′, s′
)}
subject to
ω ≥ c + γx′
ω′ ≡ e
(
s′
)
+ (1 + r)x′
e
(
s′
)
≡ (1− α) [p (γθ (1 + r)− 1 + δ) /α]
α/(α−1) [z′max{1, p/θ′}]1/(1−α)
γx′ ≥ −ηω,
and as part of the solution we obtain the decision rule x′ (ω, s). The split of x′ between γθpk
′ and
b′ is arbitrary from the country’s perspective, since capital and bonds are perfect substitutes in
channelling saving. Hence, only the cross-sectional distribution of total saving will matter for the
equilibrium, not the cross-sectional distributions of capital or net foreign bonds individually.
The form of the borrowing constraint is originally γb′ ≥ −ηω and k′ ≥ 0. However, since
countries are indiﬀerent between saving in the form of capital or foreign bonds, if they have the
possibility of avoiding any of the two borrowing constraints by adjusting their portfolio composition
they will always choose not to be constrained.9 The relevant borrowing constraint thus applies to
x′.
The problem above is simply that of a country subject to a random endowment and with
access to trade in noncontingent bonds in order to smooth out the ﬂuctuations in income. This is
essentially the problem studied in Clarida (1990) or in Huggett (1993), the main diﬀerence being
in the market clearing condition. It is important to notice, however, that it is precisely by solving
for all three world prices and then using (11) that one is able to derive implications for variables
related to capital accumulation in an “endowment economies” model.
For this reformulation of the problem, the world prices r and p must ensure equilibrium in the
market for old capital, which simpliﬁes to10∫
S
kd (s) dψ =
∫
S
k′ (ω, s) dψ, (13)
and equilibrium in the market for new capital, which becomes∫
S
z
θ
kd (s)α I{p≥θ}dψ = (γγθ − 1 + δ)
∫
S
kd (s) dψ, (14)
9That is, as long as the multiplier associated with any of the two borrowing constraints is not zero a country will
not choose to be constrained in one of the assets and not the other. Otherwise, by simply changing its portfolio
composition, a country would be able to strictly increase lifetime utility at no cost.
10Since there is no uncertainty at the worldwide level, aggregate world quantities are time-invariant.
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where I{p≥θ} is an indicator function that takes value 1 if p ≥ θ and 0 otherwise. It turns out that
equation (14) can be solved explicitly for r as a function of p:
r =
1
γθ
[
α (γγθ − 1 + δ)
∫
S (z/p)
1/(1−α) I{p<θ}dψ∫
S (z/θ)
1/(1−α) I{p≥θ}dψ
]
+
1
γθ
[α (γγθ − 1)− (1− α) δ + 1]− 1. (15)
From the equilibrium condition in the market for foreign bonds (9), together with equations
(12) and (13), we also obtain a single condition in terms of saving:∫
S
x′ (ω, s) dψ = γθp
∫
S
kd (s) dψ. (16)
The model’s equilibrium prices will be the values of r, p and R that satisfy equations (10), (15)
and (16). This system can be solved recursively, and it is further simpliﬁed from the fact that only
equation (16) depends directly on decisions.
4 Solution Method
A closed-form solution for the steady-state of any of the three model world economies is not available
and therefore I use numerical methods. In this section I brieﬂy describe the main steps of the
procedure, which is similar across trade arrangements - see Castro (2004) for further details. Under
BT, the main step of the algorithm ﬁnds the real world interest rate that clears the world bond
market. Under FT, the main step ﬁnds the world relative price of investment that clears the market
for new capital, as described by equation (16), with the real interest rate being given exactly by
equation (15) at each stage.
For given world prices, I solve an individual country’s problem by value function iteration, using
nonlinear continuous approximation methods. The Bellman equation holds on a ﬁnite grid for the
state-space. I then use Gaussian quadrature to compute the conditional expectation on the right-
hand-side of the Bellman equation and three-dimensional cubic spline interpolation to evaluate the
value function at states outside the grid. Once the equilibrium decision rules have been solved for,
I compute the optimal decisions on a much ﬁner grid. The market outcome associated with given
world prices is computed by simulating the problem of an individual country for a large number of
periods, where decisions at states outside the grid are found by simple linear interpolation.
5 Measurement and Calibration
The relevant data set is a panel of 110 countries from 1961 to 1996, a subset of the Penn World
Table (PWT), version 6.1, described in Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). This panel is selected
in order to maximize the number of countries and years with complete information on both incomes
and investment. I next describe the main elements of the measurement and calibration procedure.
Appendix A.1 and Castro (2004) contain further details.
16
Regarding the measurement of productivity indexes, one ﬁrst issue concerns the trends γz and
γθ. Since the PWT does not provide a direct way to identify the latter, and since diﬀerent values
for γθ do not tend to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on this paper’s results, I assume γθ = 1. In the
quantitative analysis, all growth is therefore due to growth in Xz.
A second issue is the measurement of the country-speciﬁc components θ and z. The θ’s could in
principle be identiﬁed directly from the relative investment price data, that is from PIpwt/PCpwt,
where PIpwt and PCpwt are the PWT data for the domestic price levels of investment and con-
sumption, respectively.11 These relative price series, however, turn out to be fairly noisy for some
countries, suggesting the existence of measurement error that could introduce a downward bias
on the persistence of technological indexes. I therefore start by ﬁltering the raw series, in order
to reduce the measurement error.12 The resulting smoothed series (PI/PC)sm correspond to the
“true” underlying panel actually used to identify θ.
In order to measure the z shocks, and consistently with the nationwide resource constraint,
it is necessary to concentrate on output measured in consumption units, using domestic prices.
In practice, this may be achieved by adjusting PPP incomes from the PWT, so that investment
expenditures are measured in terms of consumption units, using domestic rather than international
prices. To this end, I compute investment expenditures as (PI/PC)sm Ipwt, where Ipwt is the PWT
data for PPP-adjusted investment. Based upon this measure of investment, I construct a measure
of adjusted output Y a for each country-year pair given by
Y a = Y pwt −
[
1−
(
PI
PC
)sm]
Ipwt,
where Y pwt corresponds to real GDP per worker in PPP terms. This paper’s results under any of
the three trade arrangements, however, will be expressed in terms output as it is measured in the
PWT, i.e. they refer to:
ym = y + (1− θ) i, (17)
where y and i correspond, respectively, to output and gross investment in the model, both in
eﬀective units of labor.
To construct a panel for Solow residuals, I follow the standard approach of relying on a single
aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function, and using data on Y a and on the aggregate capital
stock per worker to back out Apwtz residually.13 The resulting detrended observations zpwt constitute
11This identiﬁcation is of course legitimate only under the simplifying assumption that intratemporal trade between
investment and consumption is not permitted under BT. Only in this case do relative investment prices reﬂect relative
sectoral productivities. In reality, we do observe such trades in the data but, as discussed in the Introduction, their
scope seems to be quite limited. The assumption of nontradable consumption under BT should be regarded as a
convenient approximation.
12I use a simple exponential ﬁlter, with smoothing parameter equal to 0.5. The motivation to perform this ﬁltering
is merely to be on the safe side. The procedure only considers to be measurement error very wild movements in the
series from one period to the next. Diﬀerent ﬁltering procedures tend to produce very similar results. An alternative
approach, followed by Restuccia and Urrutia (2001), would be to average observations over some years.
13This approach is legitimate given that aggregation obtains under BT, as already discussed in footnote 6.
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measures of z. For simplicity I refer to z as Solow residuals, or TFP. Rendering the series stationary
is accomplished by removing a linear time trend, common to all countries. This procedure yields a
point estimate for γz of 1.02, implying an annual growth rate of TFP of 1.5 percent.
Once the panel for productivity indexes is obtained, the seven parameters of stochastic process
are selected so as to approximately equate seven key theoretical moments implied by (1) with the
corresponding empirical moments.14 Importantly, this ensures that the relevant properties of the
distribution of productivity indexes implied by the estimated process resembles reasonably well the
empirical counterparts. Table 1 reports the resulting parameters, and µ is simply normalized to
zero in the calibration.15
Table 1: VAR Parameters
ρzz ρzθ ρθz ρθθ σz σθ σzθ
0.995 -0.014 -0.001 0.980 0.052 0.096 0.003
The remaining parameter values are summarized in Table 2. The depreciation rate is δ = 0.06
and the physical capital share is α = 1/3, consistently with independent evidence on income
shares.16 The parameter γn equals 1.019, the mean across countries of the average annual growth
rate of the labor force, computed from the PWT. The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is σ = 1.5,
a standard choice in quantitative analysis, and in accordance with many empirical estimates.
Table 2: Benchmark Calibration
β σ δ γ
z
γ
θ
γ
n
α η
0.983 1.5 0.06 1.02 1.0 1.019 1/3 0.37
Following Baxter and Crucini (1995), I select the discount factor to β = 0.983, which approxi-
mately equates the equilibrium real world interest rate under BT to 6.5 percent, the postwar U.S.
average of the annual real return on capital (see King and Rebelo, 2000). Finally I select η = 0.37,
so that the model under BT matches the standard deviation of the trade balance to GDP in the
data and thus, in this sense, features a realistic amount of cross-country trade.
14Speciﬁcally, let Vj ≡ E
 
sts

t−j

, for j = 0, 1, 2. These theoretical moments may be computed analytically
(see Hamilton (1994), pp. 265-266). The seven moments to be matched are the three in V0, plus the two diag-
onal elements of each of V1 and V2. The parameters in Table 1 approximately equate these moments to their
empirical counterparts. Compactly, the empirical counterparts correspond to (TI)−1

i,t (xit − x¯t) (yit − y¯t) and
((T − j) I)−1
i,t
(xit − x¯t) (xit−j − x¯t), for x, y ∈ {z, θ}, where x¯t and y¯t are the cross-sectional sample means, and
T and I are respectively the number of years and countries in the sample.
15Similar parameter values obtain if we restrict the sample to countries with frequent benchmark year data, where
actual price information was collected, rather than extrapolated. Speciﬁcally, this is the case for the subsample of 35
countries with benchmark data in 1980, 1985 and 1996.
16The use of a common depreciation rate and capital share for all countries and time periods is also adopted in most
development studies, such as Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). Gollin
(2002) provides evidence justifying a common capital share, equal to about 1/3, as long as proprietors’ income is
accounted as labor income.
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6 Findings
I ﬁrst describe the experiments. I consider two separate surprise changes in trade restrictions. One
moves the world economy from BT to NT (move to autarky), the other from BT to FT (trade
liberalization). When liberalizing trade, the upper bound on borrowing is kept constant across BT
and FT, so that the only element changing is the tradability of consumption goods. Similarly, when
moving to autarky, the only element changing is the degree of access to world credit markets.17
The goal of the experiments is to (i) compare the cross-country dispersion in incomes and
capital-output ratios across trade regimes, (ii) compare the aggregate world level of income and
capital across trade regimes, and (iii) perform a welfare analysis, both in the aggregate and for
subsets of countries.
It turns out that trade liberalization produces welfare numbers that, based upon a steady-
state comparison, are quite large quantitatively. Hence, for this regime change only, I also report
results that incorporate transitional eﬀects. In Section 6.1 I concentrate ﬁrst on the consequences
for inequality, i.e. dispersion in world incomes, and in Section 6.2 I study the consequences for
eﬃciency, i.e. average world incomes and welfare.
The equilibrium prices under FT turn out to be p = 0.63 and r = 7.3 percent. The world
interest rate is above the one in the BT allocation, 6.5 percent, since foreign bonds under FT have
to compete with physical capital as a store of value.
The equilibrium world price of capital goods under FT induces a pattern of specialization in
production in the world economy. In the long-run, about 16 percent of the countries (those with
θ < p) specialize in the production of investment goods, with the remaining 84 percent specializing
in the production of consumption goods. The production of investment goods is therefore highly
concentrated.
In terms of the long-run cross-sectional distribution of net foreign assets under BT, 31 percent
of the economies are constrained in world credit markets. Under FT this number becomes only
0.07 percent, since economies have a multitude of margins along which to trade internationally.
6.1 Inequality
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 reports some summary statistics characterizing the cross-sectional
dispersion of the world distributions of real GDP per worker (RY) and capital-output ratios (RKY),
both measured relative to the corresponding world (geometric) means, in the data and in the
model. The second column computes the predicted change in actual dispersion. In obtaining these
numbers, the model’s overall change in dispersion is adjusted by the model’s initial explanatory
17It turns out that under BT the borrowing constraint binds for just under 1/3 of the countries in the long-run.
Therefore, eliminating ﬁnancial ﬂows will in fact provide a good idea of the importance of trade in credit markets.
Appendix A.3 presents a simple computation indicating that the main results would not change signiﬁcantly, even if
all countries were initially unconstrained under BT.
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power.18 This is an important feature of the quantitative predictions of Table 3. Since the model
under BT provides a quantitative measure of the importance of technological diﬀerences, relative
to other factors, in accounting for actual dispersion, it is natural to use this information in making
predictions about the likely eﬀect of the trade regime changes.
To compute the model’s moments, the unconditional long-run distributions of RY and RKY
were ﬁrst approximated by simulation. Second, several panels of 110 countries over 36 periods
were obtained by ﬁrst drawing independently 110 initial conditions from the unconditional joint
distribution of states and then by iterating forward on the model’s transition function for 36 periods,
starting from each diﬀerent initial condition. For each sample panel, a set of moments was computed
which is the exact counterpart of the data moments. The results reported are long-run averages of
the model’s moments, computed over 20,000 sample panels.
Consistent with the discussion in Section 3, Table 3 shows that under FT the model features
a substantial degree of worldwide equalization of capital-output ratios. The departure from exact
equalization is simply due to the correction to measured output described in (17). As a conse-
quence, a reduction in trade barriers that implemented FT could achieve a signiﬁcant reduction
in the worldwide income inequality, 7.4 percent, as measured by the change in the standard devi-
ation of log RY. This eﬀect is accounted in large part by a reduction of nearly 15 percent in the
dispersion of RKY. What is perhaps more surprising, even from a qualitative standpoint, is that
income inequality is also reduced when the world economy moves from BT to NT. The eﬀect is
quantitatively less signiﬁcant, the decrease being just 1.3 percent, but it is also associated with a
decline in the dispersion of RKY.
The key to understanding the diﬀerent implications for dispersion of BT and NT is to examine
how international borrowing and lending aﬀects the capacity to accumulate capital. In this regard,
it follows that under NT diﬀerent countries face diﬀerent domestic interest rates, whereas under BT
countries unconstrained in world credit markets face the same ﬁxed world interest rate. Formally,
from the ﬁrst-order conditions under both NT and BT one obtains
Es
[
αy′/k′ + θ′ (1− δ)
γθθ
]
=
(
1 + rd
)
(1 + π (ω, s)) (18)
where
π (ω, s) ≡ −covs
{
βγ−σ
u′ (c′)
u′ (c)
,
αy′/k′ + θ′ (1− δ)
γθθ
}
is the risk premium. Equation (18) reveals a link between the domestic interest rate, rd, and
18I decompose a variable y as the part determined by technology (x) and the part determined by other factors
outside the model (z), so that y = x + z. Assuming z to be invariant to trade regime changes and cov (x′, z′) =
cov (x, z) we have std(y′) /std(y) =
√
1 + α∆ − 1, where primes denote variables after the regime change, with
∆ ≡ [var (x′)− var (x)] / var(x) and α ≡ var (x) /var (y). The model’s predicted change is thus downweighted by the
model’s explanatory power under BT.
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Table 3: Cross-Sectional Dispersion in Incomes and
Capital-Output Ratios: Steady-State
Variable Dispersion %∆ Dispersion
RY Data 1.063 –
BT 0.978 –
FT 0.892 -7.39%
NT 0.963 -1.30%
RKY Data 0.632 –
BT 0.354 –
FT 0.113 -15.25%
NT 0.306 -4.05%
Notes: RY and RKY are, respectively, GDP per worker and
capital-output ratios relative to their world means. Disper-
sion is the time average of log standard deviations. %∆
Dispersion is the percentage change in actual average dis-
persion implied by FT and NT.
capital-output ratios. The domestic interest rate under NT is
rd =
{
Es
[
βγ−σu′ (c′)
u′ (c)
]}−1
− 1
and it varies across countries. Under BT, instead, all unconstrained economies face the same world
interest rate rd = r.
To interpret equation (18), it is useful to recognize that, quantitatively, country diﬀerences in
RKY under BT turn out to be almost entirely due to country diﬀerences in θ (see Castro (2004)).
We may thus ignore country diﬀerences in z when trying to understand the dispersion in RKY in
the model. To develop some intuition, assume also that π (ω, s) is a constant (as it turns out, it
varies little across countries). In this case, equation (18) says that capital-output ratios will be more
responsive to diﬀerences in θ under BT (where there is a sizable number of economies unconstrained
in world credit markets) rather than under NT, as long as rd under NT varies negatively with θ.
It turns out that rd does vary inversely with θ. The reason is that, for a closed economy, changes
in investment must be matched by changes in saving, and the domestic interest rate must adjust
to give agents the right incentives. For instance, a decrease in θ makes investment cheaper, and
rd must increase in order to entice agents to increase saving. The resulting increase in the capital-
output ratio is thus not as large under NT. In other words, there is a leverage eﬀect on investment
when economies are open. The observed cross-sectional dispersion in θ thus translates into a higher
cross-sectional dispersion in RKY under BT, rather than under NT.
An important advantage of studying the eﬀect of trade regime changes in the context of a fully-
speciﬁed model is that we may rely upon a well-deﬁned notion of openness, which is independent
from the eﬀect of endogenous variables. Purely empirical approaches studying the eﬀect of openness
on economic development and growth often provide results that are hard to interpret, precisely
because in those cases it is very diﬃcult to meet the exogeneity requirement.
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Figure 3: World Prices during Transition (BT→FT)
In this paper, there is a natural and precise deﬁnition of openness. Increased openness may be
deﬁned as a regime change which allows for at least as many trades as before. Deﬁned in this way,
Table 3 suggests that openness may actually generate an increase in worldwide income inequality,
if restricted to simple borrowing and lending. Nevertheless, openness may ultimately lead to a
substantial reduction in inequality across countries, by allowing for free trade between consumption
and capital goods as well. While the eﬀect of openness on world inequality is ambiguous in general,
it may signiﬁcantly reduce world income inequality. This depends on the speciﬁc modiﬁcation of the
trade arrangement. For changes in openness less stylized than the ones considered here, potentially
featuring both types of modiﬁcation simultaneously, the eﬀect of openness on inequality boils down
to a quantitative issue.19
It is also interesting to look at the transitional eﬀects on inequality associated with a full
liberalization of trade (move from BT to FT). The world economy is initially in the BT steady-
state and, following the surprise permanent change in the trade arrangement, it will move towards
19The empirical economic development literature has emphasized an increase in the dispersion in world incomes
since the 1960’s - see, among many others, Parente and Prescott (1993). It is interesting to note that, under the
view that the increase in openness most countries have been experiencing in the last few decades was mostly due to
enhanced ﬁnancial market integration, the model would be consistent with this prediction.
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the FT steady-state, to which it will converge only asymptotically. Appendix A.2 provides some
details on the computation of the transition. The adjustment is induced by the price sequences
plotted in Figure 3. One may then study the evolution over time of inequality in incomes and
capital-output ratios following this regime change.
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Figure 4: Transitional Dynamics of Inequality (BT→FT)
A quick glance at Figure 4 reveals that the most signiﬁcant eﬀects on inequality arise con-
temporaneously with the regime change. One year after abolishing all impediments to trade, the
cross-country dispersion in both RY and RKY is reduced nearly to the new long-run values. The
initial decrease in income inequality is accompanied by a signiﬁcant increase in the variation in
capital-output ratios. These large eﬀects on impact stem from the interaction between the equal-
izing forces of trade in investment, and from the fact that initial capital is predetermined. There
does not appear to exist a simple intuition for why this is the case, in part because output refers to
measured output as deﬁned in (17). On the one hand, the dispersion in measured output decreases,
because the dominant eﬀect is a decrease in the cross-country variation of investment. On the other
hand, the dispersion in capital-output ratios increases, since the dominant eﬀect is a decrease in the
covariance between measured output and capital. This decrease is due to the fact that countries
with low initial capital now invest a large amount of resources, which translates into a large amount
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of capital goods, and thus large measured income, with a ﬁxed world price of investment.
6.2 Eﬃciency
To assess the implications for eﬃciency of the diﬀerent trade regimes, one may look at the changes
in world output and, more importantly, at the changes in welfare. For the welfare eﬀects I focus on
the consumption equivalent. In particular, I compute the percent increase in consumption common
across countries, dates and states of nature, such that agents would be on average indiﬀerent
between remaining under BT and changing the trade regime by moving to either FT or NT.
For both experiments, I ﬁrst perform a steady-state comparison.20 Formally, I compute the
equivalent variation in steady-state consumption λ given by
∫
S
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
βγ1−σ
)t
u
[
(1 + λ) cBTt (ω0, s0) , 1
]
dψBT =
∫
S
vj (ω0, s0) dψ
j (19)
for j=FT,NT and where
{
cBTt (ω0, s0)
}
is an equilibrium consumption sequence under BT for
country (ω0, s0).
21 Table 4 reports the outcome of the steady-state analysis.
Table 4: Eﬃciency in the Long-Run
Experiment λ ∆% c ∆% kd ∆% y ∆% ym ∆% std(ln c)
BT→NT -2.01% -1.51% -8.05% -2.09% -3.49% 0.34%
BT→FT 35.01% 29.85% 64.25% 31.99% 40.32% -4.01%
Notes: The ﬁrst column reports the welfare change. The second to ﬁfth columns report
the percent change in average consumption, domestic capital, GDP in consumption
units and measured GDP, respectively. The last column reports the percent change in
consumption variability.
There are two important observations. First, there is an extremely large welfare gain associated
with a full liberalization of trade. This of course begs several questions, which the paper will try
to address next: Where are the large gains coming from? Will they vanish once the transition is
accounted for? Second, fully restricting trade entails only a relatively modest welfare loss, much less
signiﬁcant than the gain from trade liberalization. The comparison between the two magnitudes
is important: it suggests that trade in goods is likely to be much more important than access to
ﬁnancial markets in raising living standards.
Table 4 attempts to give a rough idea of the composition of these welfare changes. First,
associated with any of the two regime changes, there are variations in welfare both due to changes
in the level of consumption, and also due to changes in consumption variability. The dominant
eﬀect is clearly the level eﬀect. In fact, not only the increase in consumption variability itself is
20The steady-state comparison is meant only as a preliminary calculation. Naturally, since not just the trade regime
but also the cross-sectional distribution are changing in each experiment, the results are hard to interpret. This will
not be the case in Table 5, when transitional eﬀects are accounted for.
21Computing λ in practice involved evaluating lifetime utility for a large number of countries, which are independent
draws from the appropriate long-run distributions, through cubic spline interpolation.
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quantitatively small, also the associated welfare change is likely to be rather small. Most of the work
in this class of models has consistently found tiny welfare eﬀects arising from complete consumption
smoothing - e.g. see Lucas (1987), and much of the subsequent literature on the welfare costs of
business cycles. Hence, any insurance gains or losses associated with openness should contribute
little to the welfare numbers.
The long-run changes in consumption levels are naturally accounted for by long-run changes in
income levels. Table 4 reports the magnitude of these changes. This answers the question of how
openness impacts on incomes. Signiﬁcant work in the cross-country growth regression literature,
reviewed recently in Rodr´ıguez and Rodrik (2000), has tried to answer the same question. Frankel
and Romer (1999), in particular, estimate (although not very precisely) that an increase in one
percentage point in the component of the trade share that is induced by geographical factors (their
measure of openness) causes a large increase in output per capita of about 2-3 percent. The current
framework also predicts a large increase in long-run incomes as a result of higher openness, much
more signiﬁcant in terms of reducing barriers to trade in capital goods. The magnitudes, however,
appear to be substantially higher in Table 4.22 Notice that, in fact, there are no long-run growth
eﬀects in the current setup, as as all growth in the model ultimately originates from the world
technology frontier. Still, there will be important transitional eﬀects, as can be seen from Figure 4.
I will now concentrate on the trade liberalization regime change. One important question con-
cerns the transition to the new steady state. That is, one would like to know whether the large
welfare gain comes mostly from capital accumulation. Since the change in the capital stock results
in part from capital being produced more eﬃciently worldwide, but also in part from intertempo-
ral consumption decisions, the full eﬀect on welfare is necessarily missed by simple steady-state
comparisons.
To answer this question, one has to explicitly compute the transition from BT to FT. To incor-
porate the transitional eﬀects in the welfare numbers, the right-hand-side of (19) must be replaced
by
∫
S v0 (ω, s) dψ0, where v0 and ψ0 are the value function and the cross-sectional distribution that
obtain at time t = 0, the period the regime change takes place. Importantly, ψBT diﬀers from ψ0
only due to instantaneous price movements, occurring in the period of the regime change. This
means the relevant initial conditions (k0, b0 and s0) are held constant in this experiment (see the
Appendix A.2 for further details).
With the transitional eﬀects factored in, the welfare gain only drops to 24.74 percent, which
is still a very large number. The dynamics of world output (Y =
∫
ymdψ) and world capital
22As mentioned before, changes in openness in the current analysis are deﬁned as trade regime changes, which
do not have a counterpart in the simple one-dimensional measures of openness considered in the empirical growth
literature. For this reason, one may not directly compare the numbers from Frankel and Romer (1999) with those
in Table 4. In addition to providing an estimate of the eﬀect of openness on incomes, one advantage of the current
approach is in allowing for a welfare analysis. According to Table 4, incomes systematically overstate the more
relevant welfare changes.
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(K =
∫
kddψ) following the regime change from BT to FT is depicted in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Transitional Dynamics of Eﬃciency (BT→FT)
The ﬁrst thing to notice is the large increase in output that occurs on impact, without an
associated increase in capital. As much as half of the eﬃciency gain is enjoyed contemporaneously
with the regime change. This purely static eﬃciency gain results from trade specialization. Under
BT, countries that are ineﬃcient at producing investment goods are forced to do so, since this is
the only way they may obtain capital. Under FT, these countries may simply concentrate in the
production of consumption goods, where they have a comparative advantage, and simply import
capital goods from abroad. The worldwide allocation of capital and labor across sectors is improved,
and this is what drives the initial large gain. Importantly, this eﬃciency gain does not involve any
sacriﬁce in terms of consumption, and it helps explain why the welfare gain remains high when
transitional eﬀects are factored in.
Figure 5 reveals that there are important dynamics as well. The full beneﬁts of opening up fully
to trade arise only through time, via capital accumulation, requiring a time horizon of about 50
years after abolishing trade barriers to be enjoyed in their entirety. The reason why countries choose
to accumulate more capital should be clear. Due to specialization in production, the marginal
productivity of capital is now higher in each single country, since it is governed by the sectoral
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productivity level which is relatively higher. Each country experiences something analogous to a
increase in TFP in the standard neoclassical growth model and, as in the standard model, this
fosters capital accumulation.
An additional beneﬁt from computing the transition is that one may look at the breakdown of
the welfare gains by subgroups of countries. In order to capture the key heterogeneity in the welfare
gains, Table 5 concentrates on selected quantiles of the model’s joint cross-sectional distribution
of RY and RKY under BT. As before, the computation of consumption equivalents is based upon
the initial distribution ψ0. However, for each cell in the table, integration is now done only over
individual states giving rise to values of RY and RKY in the appropriate ranges.
Table 5 concentrates on countries in the tails of the joint distribution of incomes and capital-
output ratios (top and bottom 10 percent) and on “typical” countries, those roughly in the center of
this distribution. In order to interpret the results in this table, notice that cross-country diﬀerences
in RKY capture mostly the diﬀerences in θ, whereas diﬀerences in RY capture mostly the diﬀerences
in z.23
Table 5: Distributional Welfare Eﬀects (BT→FT)







RKY
RY
< 0.1 1/3− 2/3 > 0.9
< 0.1 0.509 0.459 0.461
1/3− 2/3 0.195 0.181 0.189
> 0.9 0.217 0.214 0.257
Notes: Table entries are average consumption equiv-
alents for countries in speciﬁc interpercentile ranges of
the joint long-run cross-sectional distribution of RY and
RKY under BT.
The largest gains are to be enjoyed by very poor countries with low capital-output ratios,
some of which may have equivalent consumption increases twice as large as the world average
(25 percent). Countries that enjoy the least gains are those situated roughly in the center of the
distribution, whereas countries enjoying the higher gains are those most diﬀerent from the world
norm. Most of the heterogeneity in the welfare gains occurs along the RKY dimension, suggesting
the importance of the relative eﬃciency in capital goods production. Countries with signiﬁcantly
ineﬃcient investment goods sectors, thus with lower capital-output ratios, are the ones who stand
to gain the most.
Table 6 identiﬁes which countries fall into each cell of Table 5. To do so, it uses the information
from the PWT on the actual joint distribution of RY and RKY in 1996. This is the model’s
estimate of the welfare gain actual countries would stand to enjoy, had the full trade liberalization
taken place. One interesting observation is that many of the countries that happen to be in the
23Under BT, it turns out that cross-country diﬀerences in θ account for about all the dispersion in RKY but only
for about 15 percent of the dispersion in RY - see Castro (2004).
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center are located in Latin America.24 Some of these countries pursued import-substitution policies
throughout the time span of the PWT which advocated, in particular, the domestic production of
equipment goods that would normally be imported at lower prices. The ﬁndings in Table 5 are
suggestive in this regard, and may perhaps oﬀer some insight in help explaining their adoption of
these policies.
Table 6: Joint Distribution of RY and RKY in the PWT in 1996







RKY
RY
< 0.1 1/3− 2/3 > 0.9
< 0.1
ETH,MOZ
RWA,UGA
EGY –
1/3− 2/3 GNB
BWA,COL,CPV,CRI,DOM
FJI,GAB,HND,IDN,IRN
JOR,MAR,NAM,PAN,PHL
PNG,TUN,TUR,URY,ZWE
IRL
> 0.9 TZA ROM
AUT,BEL
FRA,NOR
Notes: Country codes are from the Data Appendix of PWT6.1, described in Heston, Summers,
and Aten (2002). The corresponding countries are listed in Appendix A.1.
6.3 Discussion
This paper has tried to quantify the inequality and eﬃciency eﬀects on economic development of
diﬀerent worldwide trade regimes. It may be worth pointing out the similarity in spirit between this
exercise and the one in Lucas (1987). In his well-known book, Lucas asked what would the welfare
eﬀects be if the economy was able to completely eliminate the cyclical ﬂuctuations in aggregate
consumption. Analogously, the idea here has been to consider simple changes in the worldwide
trade arrangement, which are clearly speciﬁed in the context of the model. Similarly to Lucas
(1987), the changes in the trade regime are admittedly extreme, and the analysis is silent about
the precise mechanism through which changes in policy variables may aﬀect trade barriers. The
idea is quite simply to provide an upper bound for the potential eﬀects of the trade regime changes,
namely in terms of welfare.
An important diﬀerence, however, arises in terms of the results, particularly regarding trade
liberalization. Since Lucas (1987) ﬁnds tiny welfare gains, the issue of relaxing the extreme nature
of the experiment, and that of being more explicit about the policy mechanism, becomes a relatively
unimportant discussion. In the current paper, instead, the “ﬁrst pass” on the trade liberalization
question produces extremely large welfare gains. Unlike in Lucas (1987), here it does become
important to discuss the extent to which the large upper bound is a robust result. A careful
24Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela are all very close to the middle cell. The US has one of the
highest RY in 1996, but not one of the highest RKY.
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discussion must be necessarily left for future research, but I will consider some possible concerns
next.
One ﬁrst issue is whether the world economy would be able to get suﬃciently close to the FT
arrangement through any feasible policy change. In fact, under FT, both physical capital and
consumption would have to be extremely ﬂexible internationally, whereas some of the barriers to
trade, such as geographical factors, could hardly be eliminated.25 In other words, the trade liber-
alization experiment assumes all goods become tradable, whereas in reality this would not happen.
Dealing with this problem does not appear to be an easy task. In the context of the current set-
ting, a partial answer may be to identify cross-country diﬀerences in the relative productivity of
investment goods through diﬀerences in investment prices relative to tradable consumption prices.
Presumably, this would lead to a lower cross-country dispersion of investment-speciﬁc productivi-
ties, and hence lower gains from trade. Hsieh and Klenow (2003), however, document that the price
of tradable consumption is still signiﬁcantly positively correlated with incomes, although less than
the price of nontradable consumption. Compared with the price of all consumption (the one used
in Section 5 in computing relative investment prices), the price of tradable consumption displays
a reasonably similar association with incomes. This evidence suggests that, based upon the price
of investment relative to tradable consumption, there would be lower cross-country variation in
investment-speciﬁc productivities, but presumably not enough to dramatically lower the welfare
gains.
An alternative way to dealing with this problem is to introduce transportation costs in the
model. One option, following much of the international trade literature, is to specify them as
“iceberg costs”, such that a fraction of every unit of consumption that is traded is simply lost in
the process. This generates a no-intratemporal-trade region at every point in time, where a group
of countries with levels of θ suﬃciently close to the world relative investment price do not ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to engage in intratemporal trade. These countries interact with the rest of the world as
if they were in the BT trade regime. The remaining countries interact as in the FT trade regime,
and they specialize completely either in the production of consumption goods, or in the production
of investment goods. An important obstacle to this approach is that it is very hard to obtain
reliable information on the quantitative magnitude of transportation costs, something which would
be needed for calibration. Appendix A.3 develops a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, based
upon the full model, to try to get some idea of the magnitude of transportation costs that would
reduce signiﬁcantly the gains from liberalizing trade in goods. The result from this calculation
suggests that transportation costs would have to be in excess of about 1/3 of the sale price at the
25Eaton and Kortum (2001) estimate the amount of barriers to trade implied by actual trade ﬂows in equipment,
some of which would be of strictly geographical nature and therefore hardly removable. In addition, also the structures
component of investment is likely to remain relatively less tradable. The current framework could in principle
be extended to account explicitly for diﬀerences between equipment and structures along the lines of Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997).
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production origin, and probably much larger, in order to have signiﬁcant eﬀects.
Another potential issue is whether observed diﬀerences in relative investment prices are mostly
due to the presence of tariﬀs, taxes, or similar types of investment distortions.26 If this were the
case, then one would not be able to argue about these diﬀerences being mostly technology-induced,
and thus exploitable through specialization and trade. Hence, it would be important to know
whether higher relative investment prices in poor countries are simply due to higher barriers to
capital accumulation. Distortions certainly account for some of the observed world dispersion in
investment prices. The evidence by Eaton and Kortum (2001), however, reveals that even though
the cross-country variability in equipment prices per se is large, it is not systematically associated
with incomes. In fact, if anything, richer countries have slightly higher equipment prices.27 In turn,
relative equipment prices and incomes are strongly negatively correlated. This suggests that tariﬀs
are unlikely to account for most of the cross-country variation in relative investment prices that
is systematically associated with incomes. The technological interpretation pursued in this paper
looks like a more plausible candidate.
Still regarding relative investment prices, there is also an argument pointing to the welfare
numbers being underestimated. The reason is that measured international diﬀerences in the relative
price of investment goods most likely underestimate diﬀerences in the true eﬀective price. This
eﬀective price of capital corresponds to a broad notion that includes all investment costs (like the
cost of learning how to operate the capital equipment) and not just those measured by market prices.
This notion would clearly be the most appropriate to identify investment-speciﬁc technological
indexes. Eaton and Kortum (2001) attempt to infer eﬀective price diﬀerences from trade ﬂows in
equipment alone and conclude that eﬀective prices are indeed much more dispersed internationally
than observed market prices.
Yet a further issue is that productivity is unlikely to be invariant to changes in the trade regime,
contrary to what is assumed throughout the paper. There is in fact plant-level empirical evidence
pointing to signiﬁcant productivity gains associated with trade liberalization - see for example
Pavcnik (2002). This eﬀect is presumably going to be stronger in the most ineﬃcient economies,
those farther away from the technology frontier. In this case, one might expect trade liberalization
to contribute directly to an increase the average level of productivity in the world economy, while
at the same time to reduce cross-country technology diﬀerences. While a full investigation of this
issue is outside the scope of this paper, one is tempted to conjecture that, once trade liberalization
26This is the view of the relative price data taken by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997). Note that investment
and consumption prices in the Penn World Tables are ﬁnal sale prices and therefore incorporate the eﬀect of tariﬀs,
taxes and explicit transportation costs.
27Aggregate investment prices themselves also have a slightly positive correlation with incomes (equal to 0.28 in
1996, according to the Penn World Table data). Hsieh and Klenow (2003) make the same point. Using theory as
a tool for measurement, they argue that the evidence clearly favors the view of a technology-induced variation in
relative prices, rather than an investment distortions-induced one.
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is allowed to impact on productivity, the gains from trade can only be larger. Does this mean the
gains from liberalizing trade in goods are also potentially larger than the gains from liberalizing
ﬁnancial markets? Not necessarily, as one may also argue that the lack of access to credit is what
is key in preventing poor countries from gaining access to the technologies of rich countries. In this
case, there could be little technological diﬀerences left to be exploited by trade in goods, and most
of the gains from trade would be associated with liberalizing ﬁnancial markets.
To summarize this discussion, there does not appear to be an obvious reason that would make
such extremely large welfare gains associated with a liberalization of trade simply vanish. On
balance, there are reasons suggesting the welfare numbers could be reﬁned downwards. This re-
ﬁnement is an important task that needs to be addressed in future work. At the same time, there
clearly is suﬃcient room for the numbers to decline, and it seems likely that the main message of
the paper, a large welfare gain associated with a liberalization of trade, would persist.
I now discuss the robustness of the result that fully liberalizing intratemporal trade in goods,
rather further integration of ﬁnancial markets, is the regime change that generates the largest
welfare gains. There are at least two issues that could be raised. First, one could ask whether
increasing the sophistication of international ﬁnancial markets, by allowing for trade in contingent
claims, would change this conclusion. I would argue that this is unlikely to be the case. In fact,
the literature focusing on related setups has generally found very small welfare gains from perfect
international risk-sharing, two early examples being Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Backus, Kehoe,
and Kydland (1992). Second, one could also ask whether liberalizing further credit markets, in the
sense of driving the fraction of constrained countries further down relative to BT, could signiﬁcantly
alter the results. As pointed out previously, Appendix A.3 computes what may be regarded as
an upper bound for the gain from a complete liberalization of credit markets, and ﬁnds it to
be still signiﬁcantly smaller than the gain from liberalizing trade in goods. The bottom line is
that liberalizing ﬁnancial markets does not allow countries to exploit their diﬀerent sector-speciﬁc
productivities, and this is what is key in generating the large welfare gains.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the consequences for economic development of alternative international trade
arrangements. Starting from a benchmark borrowing and lending arrangement subject to an upper
bound on foreign debt, it analyzes the eﬀects of moving into each of two alternative arrangements,
by fully restricting trade and by fully liberalizing trade.
Diﬀerent changes in trade arrangements have diﬀerent consequences on cross-country income
inequality and welfare. In this respect, there are two main ﬁndings. First, the eﬀect of openness
on worldwide income inequality depends in a nontrivial way on the speciﬁc changes in the trade
arrangement. The cross-sectional dispersion in world incomes would decrease only by about 1.4
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percent if a policy were implemented that entirely eliminated international ﬁnancial ﬂows, and thus
all international trade, but it would decrease by a much higher 7.8 percent if openness were further
enhanced by allowing countries to trade capital freely for consumption goods.
Second, in terms of the welfare implications, ﬁnancial markets alone turns out to be a poor
substitute for a full liberalization of international movements in goods. The long-run average
welfare cost of going into autarky is only about 2 percent in terms of the consumption equivalent,
but the welfare gain of allowing for unrestricted trade in goods is instead a very large 35 percent
average increase in steady-state consumption. A signiﬁcant part of these large welfare gains, as
much as half, arise from specialization in production and from improvements in the international
allocation of physical capital. For this reason, when transition eﬀects are taken into account, the
average welfare gain remains at a very high 25 percent increase in consumption. These beneﬁts are
particularly high for countries with low capital-output ratios, especially among the very poorest,
some of which may enjoy equivalent consumption increases twice as high as the world average.
Put in other words, with the degree of international productivity diﬀerences speciﬁc to the
production of investment goods we are able to infer from price data, it may be of little use if a
developing country is able to obtain abroad all the funds it needs to invest domestically, in case a
substantial part of the capital goods have to be home-produced anyway. Very large beneﬁts would
instead arise if capital goods could be produced in the most eﬃcient location and then imported. In
this case, developing countries would be able to specialize in producing and exporting consumption
goods, where they have a comparative advantage.
This ﬁnding calls perhaps for an important shift in policy emphasis: eﬀorts should be concen-
trated more on the reduction of all sorts of barriers preventing trade in capital goods, including
barriers to trade in consumption goods, and less in promoting worldwide access to international
credit markets.
A Appendix
A.1 Data Set
I concentrate on a panel of 110 countries from 1961 to 1996, a subset of the Penn World Table
(PWT6.1) data set, described in Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). This is the largest panel
with complete data for real GDP per worker and real gross investment in 1996 international prices.
Real gross investment is computed as the product of the PWT6.1 series KI, POP, and RGDPCH.
Capital stocks are constructed by the perpetual inventory method, with countries assumed to be
in steady-state in 1961. The reader is referred to Castro (2004) for the full details. The com-
plete list of the countries included in the data set is the following (in parenthesis are the country
codes reported in Table 5): Algeria, Australia, Austria (AUT), Burundi, Belgium (BEL), Benin,
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Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Botswana (BWA), Central African Repub-
lic, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Colombia
(COL), Comoros, Cape Verde (CPV), Costa Rica (CRI), Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Repub-
lic (DOM), Ecuador, Egypt (EGY), Spain, Ethiopia (ETH), Finland, Fiji (FJI), France (FRA),
Gabon (GAB), U.K., Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau (GNB), Greece, Guatemala, Hong-
Kong, Honduras (HND), Indonesia (IDN), India, Ireland (IRL), Iran (IRN), Iceland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Jordan (JOR), Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mo-
rocco (MAR), Madagascar, Mexico, Mali, Mozambique (MOZ), Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi,
Malaysia, Namibia (NAM), Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Norway (NOR), Nepal, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Panama (PAN), Peru, Philippines (PHL), Papua New Guinea (PNG), Portu-
gal, Paraguay, Romania (ROM), Rwanda (RWA), Senegal, Singapore, Sierra Leone, El Salvador,
Sweden, Seychelles, Syria, Chad, Togo, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia (TUN), Turkey
(TUR), Taiwan, Tanzania (TZA), Uganda (UGA), Uruguay (URY), USA, Venezuela, South Africa,
Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe (ZWE).
A.2 Numerical Algorithm to Compute Transition
This appendix describes in some detail the numerical algorithm used to compute the world econ-
omy’s transition from the BT steady-state to the FT steady-state. The algorithm was programmed
in Fortran 90 and is available from the author upon request. At t = 0, the period when the surprise
regime change occurs, I assume that economies have access to the market for new capital goods,
but are not able to rent capital services. The alternative assumption that economies have access to
both types of trade on impact, if anything, should decrease the importance of transitional eﬀects.
The numerical algorithm may be described in the following eight steps.
1. Guess on n, the approximate number of periods it takes to complete he transition.
2. Guess on a sequence of prices {pt}
n
t=0 and set pn+1 = pn.
3. Set r0 = r
BT and solve for {rt+1}
n
t=0 by ensuring that the markets for new capital and foreign
bonds clear at t = 0 and that all three markets clear from t = 1 onward. That is, iterate
forward in recursive fashion on
rt+1 =
1
γθpt
{
At + (1− δ)Bt
γ
∫
[αzt+1 max {1, pt+1/θt+1}]
1
1−α dψt+1
}α−1
+
pt+1
γθpt
(1− δ)− 1
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for t = 0, . . . , n, where
A0 ≡
∫
(z0/θ0) k
α
0 I{p0≥θ0}dµ0
At ≡
[
γθpt−1 (1 + rt)− pt (1− δ)
αpt
] α
α−1
∫
(zt/θt) I{pt≥θt}dψt, for t = 1, . . . , n
B0 ≡
∫
k0dµ0
Bt ≡
[
γθpt−1 (1 + rt)− pt (1− δ)
α
] 1
α−1
∫
[zt max {1, pt/θt}]
1
1−α dψt, for t = 1, . . . , n
and where µ0 is the long-run cross-sectional distribution over (k0, b0, s0), which is induced by
ψBT, by the equilibrium decision rules under BT and by the stochastic process for s.
4. Given the whole price sequences {pt}
n+1
t=0 and {rt}
n+1
t=0 , solve the country’s problem at t =
0, . . . , n by backward induction, starting from vn+1 = v
FT
vt (ωt, st) = max
xt+1
{
u (ωt − γxt+1) + βγ
1−σEtvt+1 (ωt+1, st+1)
}
subject to
ωt+1 ≡ e (st+1) + (1 + rt+1)xt+1
e (st+1) ≡ (1− α)
[
γθpt (1 + rt+1)− pt+1 (1− δ)
α
] α
α−1
[zt+1 max {1, pt+1/θt+1}]
1
1−α
γxt+1 ≥ −ηωt.
Section 4 brieﬂy describes how to solve the country’s problem given prices. As part of the
solution, one obtains a sequence of decision rules {xt+1 (ωt, st)}
n
t=0 and an initial value function
v0 (ω0, s0).
5. The initial distribution µ0 and the initial prices (p0, r0) induce an initial distribution ψ0 over
(ω, s), where
ω0 = z0 max {1, p0/θ0} k
α
0 + p0 (1− δ) k0 + (1 + r0) b0.
6. With the initial condition ψ0, one may iterate forward on the system’s transition function,
induced by the decision rules from step 4 and by the stochastic process for s, to obtain a
sequence of distributions {ψt}
n
t=0. This is accomplished by computing many (in practice 2
million) sample paths for (ω, s) of length n + 1 each, starting from many diﬀerent initial
conditions which are independent draws from ψ0.
7. At each period t it is then possible to compute the excess world demand for foreign bonds as
xsdt ≡
∫
xt+1 (ωt, st) dψt − γθpt
∫ [
αzt+1 max {1, pt+1/θt+1}
γθpt (1 + rt+1)− pt+1 (1− δ)
] 1
1−α
dψt+1.
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To compute the transition, the algorithm searches for a sequence {pt}
n
t=0 such that xsdt ≈ 0 for
t = 0, . . . , n. This requires solving a system of n+1 nonlinear equations which, in practice, may
be accomplished by some multidimensional nonlinear equation solver, for instance Broyden’s
multidimensional secant algorithm (see Judd, 1998).
8. The ﬁnal step requires checking whether pn+1 ≈ p
FT and rn+1 ≈ r
FT. If this is the case, then
the initial guess of an n-period transition is appropriate. Otherwise, n has to be increased.
In practice, n = 50 provided a reasonably good approximation (for the welfare numbers in
particular, increasing n from 25 to 50 did not change the results signiﬁcantly).
A.3 Transportation Costs
This appendix presents a simpliﬁed version of the full model in the main text, to assess the potential
eﬀect of nontrivial transportation costs for the result that liberalizing trade in goods produces
very large eﬃciency gains. The idea of this exercise is to provide a simple back-of-the-envelope
calculation.
The ﬁrst step is to assess whether the simpliﬁed model version is useful. This is done by showing
that it does a good job at approximating the results of Table 4. To simplify the algebra, the focus
will be on model’s output, y, instead of measured output, ym. Output for a given country in each
of the three trade regimes may be written as:
yNT = z1/(1−α)
(
kNT
yNT
)α/(1−α)
yBT = z1/(1−α)
(
kBT
yBT
)α/(1−α)
yFT =
[
zmax
{
1,
p
θ
}]1/(1−α)(kFT
yFT
)α/(1−α)
.
To obtain simple expressions for the capital-output ratio, assume countries are in steady-state.
In this case, it follows that:
kNT
yNT
=
α
θ(rNT + δ)
kBT
yBT
=
α
θ(rBT + δ)
kFT
yFT
=
α
p(rFT + δ)
,
where rNT ≡ γσ/β − 1 = 0.083, with γθ = 1. As for r
BT and rFT, assume they take on the
equilibrium values reported in the main text, respectively 0.065 and 0.073. Assume also that each
country has a diﬀerent pair (z, θ), with these pairs distributed according to the stochastic process
considered in the main text.
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In this case, it is relatively easy to compute worldwide output y¯j ≡
∫
yjdψ, for j =NT,BT,FT.
With this information, it follows that y¯NT/y¯BT = 0.93, and that y¯FT/y¯BT = 1.29. These numbers
are reasonably close to those in Table 4, in particular they are consistent with much larger eﬃciency
gains associated with free trade in goods. If anything, these gains are slightly underestimated.28
The second step is to use this simple setting to try to predict the eﬀect of transportation costs
on y¯FT/y¯BT. Assume that the transportation costs are of the “iceberg cost” type, so that a fraction
τ c of every traded consumption good, and a fraction τ i of every traded investment good, are simply
lost. For concreteness, assume these costs are incurred by the importer of the good.
Let p∗ and r∗ be the prices that would be prevail in this new equilibrium, and denote by G the
unconditional distribution of θ. There will be three types of countries in the world economy:
1. Countries specializing in the production of investment goods, for whom θ < p∗(1 − τ i), and
that produce y∗i =
(
p∗(1−τ i)
θ z
)1/(1−α) (
α
p∗(1−τ i)(r∗+δ)
)α/(1−α)
. Let µi = G (p
∗(1− τ i)) denote
the measure of these countries.
2. Countries specializing in the production of consumption goods, for whom θ > p∗/(1 − τ c),
and that produce y∗c = z
1/(1−α)
(
α(1−τc)
p∗(r∗+δ)
)α/(1−α)
. Let µc = 1 − G (p
∗/(1− τ c)) denote the
measure of these countries.
3. Countries producing both goods, and not engaging in intratemporal trade, for whom θ ∈
[p∗(1 − τ i), p
∗/(1 − τ c)], and that produce y
∗
ci = z
1/(1−α)
(
α
θ(r∗+δ)
)α/(1−α)
. These countries
will be in measure 1− µi − µc.
World output in this scenario will be given by y¯∗ = µiy¯
∗
i + µcy¯
∗
c + (1− µi − µc) y¯
∗
ci, where the
y¯’s are computed by integrating over the appropriate productivity ranges.
The goal is to compute y¯∗/y¯BT for a range of transportation cost values, and to see whether it
diﬀers a lot from y¯FT/y¯BT. To do so, one needs to assign values to p∗ and r∗. I will set p∗ = p and
r∗ = rFT, which should provide a good approximation for small enough transportation cost values.
Clearly, in the full model, these prices would change with the amount of transportation costs. One
should view this as a simple partial equilibrium analysis, which is able to capture the direct eﬀect
of transportation costs on specialization and aggregate productivity, but not the indirect eﬀect
through world prices.
I consider two scenarios for transportation costs: (i) τ c = τ > τ i = 0, costs to trading consump-
tion goods only; and (ii) τ c = τ i = τ , uniform costs to trading both consumption and investment
goods. One drawback of case (i) is that, as τ increases, less and less countries produce investment
goods, and one should observe a rise in p∗. Instead, p∗ is in fact held constant. In other words,
28Note that the ﬁgure for y¯NT/y¯BT may be viewed as an upper bound for the potential gains of ﬁnancial market
liberalization, since the underlying expression for kBT/yBT assumes all countries are unconstrained. In fact it implies
an eﬃciency loss of going from BT to NT of 7 percent, which is indeed higher than that reported in Table 4.
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one would expect the eﬃciency gains to decrease with τ faster than case (i) implies. Case (ii),
on the other hand, produces an eﬀect that mimics the increase in p∗. However, the amount of
transportation costs is presumably too high, since they apply symmetrically to both goods. One
would expect the eﬃciency gains to decrease with τ more slowly than what is implied by case (ii).
Figure 6 represents the eﬀect on eﬃciency gains of having transportation costs from 0 percent
up to 50 percent of the relative investment price at the origin. This ﬁgure suggests that as long
as transportation costs stay below about 1/3 of the price at the origin, liberalizing trade in goods
still generates higher eﬃciency gains than liberalizing ﬁnancial markets. Probably transportation
costs would have to be much larger than this in order to have a signiﬁcant impact on the results.
It should be emphasized, however, that this is only a simple ﬁrst-pass calculation, which certainly
merits a more careful investigation.
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Figure 6: Eﬀect of Transportation Costs on Steady-State Eﬃciency Gains
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